(Continued...)

Why not hire Iraqis?
They soon figured out they needed to do that. They opened the doors to hire Iraqi translators. But they like to have Americans—it's a big issue, loyalty. But they did hire several hundred Iraqi interpreters right off the street. No interview process: "Do you speak English?" They were paid ten dollars a day.

Were they effective?
Bilingualism does not give someone the skill set to interpret.

Which skills do?
Discretion, attention to detail, meticulousness. An ability to remove yourself from the situation.

Did Iraqi translators allow a closer relationship with other Iraqis, at least?
Iraqi interpreters aren't always the solution they seem to be. A lot of Iraqis don't trust other Iraqis. And at that time I was frustrated and often annoyed that Iraqis would say to me, "I want to talk to you." And I would say, "What about this guy? He's Iraqi." And they'd say, "I want you." Because I'm not Iraqi and don't know his family and I can't go call somebody and say something. It's a tricky issue. But then other times, the Egyptian or the Lebanese interpreter has the cultural knowledge.

"They [hired] several hundred Iraqi interpreters right off the street. No interview process: 'Do you speak English?' Bilingualism does not give someone the skill set to interpret"[Iraqi translators] have been treated terribly. They've been killed. They have not been protected. They have not received visas or anything. They're being killed at very high rates. The result is many people now in Iraq think if you work with the coalition you're an idiot, because you're working with someone who doesn't care about you, and then you're killed. Some have to wear facemasks. I know people were wearing facemasks at the beginning, in interrogations. Titan hires them. I remember Ted Koppel came in, none of the Iraqis wanted to be in [Koppel's report]. They didn't want their faces on TV.

How do people react to you? You're very American-looking.
They were accepting ... I was less and less the interpreter and more and more what I think we should have more people doing: doing a real job and speaking Arabic while doing it. I was mostly interacting directly with Iraqis in Arabic, and that's what was so valuable, that's why we were able to build up some trust. Even if we weren't able to deliver them any money, we were able to deliver them ideas. We were never given a budget to provide them with anything else that might really have been useful, but we were able to build up trust.

Did the Army address the language problem?
The [linguists] are looked down on in the army as prima donnas who need a slap-down. And c'mon, recruiters? When I went in, I said I wanted to join the army to go to language school. That was why I wanted to go in. The recruiter I was talking to, his eyes glazed over. He had no idea what I was talking about. There's no awareness of it. They don't see it as a tool. Patriot missiles are seen as a tool.

How many interpreters do you think we need in Iraq?
I'd hate to give a number. Ideally every mission would have one or two interpreters. If you're going to raid houses you bring an interpreter. You'd be amazed how many don't. They just go in and say, "We're looking for guns."

Is there something Americans should know how to say in Arabic?
Pronounce it Ee-rahk, not Eye-Rack. And Moo-sleem, not Maaah-zlum. Muslim means "person who submits to Allah." Maaah-zlem sounds like a word that means "oppressor." Interesting, and a problem.

You also took part in de-Baathification interviews.
It was for public utilities. The Australian guy that was running that, he was a good guy too. He thought that he was going to be an advisor, not running the whole thing. He was told he could pick a team. But then we had to do de-Baathification interviews. We'd sit down in a room in the palace. The people were former experts, former government employees. You've got to assume at least some of them knew their jobs and some were just from Tikrit, family members who'd gotten jobs.

Was it an intense interrogation?
Nah, man. We had some stock questions: "Do you still support the Baath Party?" One guy in particular, he laughed. "Of course not," he said, "you've dissolved it." We asked them what their jobs used to be, and what they wanted their jobs to be now.

Did you find yourself getting drawn into analysis or politics? Or were you able to just repeat the words back and forth and stay out of it most of the time?
I couldn't keep myself out of it. The soldier turns to the translator and says, "Is this guy lying or not?" Man, I don't know, I'm not trained to detect that.

We did some de-Baathification interviews with five generals, ranking generals, in the Iraqi equivalent of the [U.S. Army] Corps of Engineers. They told us that before the war they were interested in two things: making the occasional bridge and land mines. There were I don't know how many land mines left over from the Iran-Iraq war and the invasion? So the people from the State Department who were commissioned to clean up land mines, they picked out these generals, and they wanted to have an Iraqi mine action agency, which I helped them set up. They had a mammoth task. So we went through the interviews with these five generals. They were interesting people. They were interested in working.

What was it like translating for an Iraqi general?
It was an intimate atmosphere, we'd seen each other many times before, I think they really wanted to work with the de-mining group. It was relaxed. It was before they replaced the windows in the palace, so it was like being outside. It was casual. But then something would happen. Like I was brought into a room, and someone told me that they have information on one of the generals. I was put in many sensitive situations like that.

What happened to the generals?
They were excluded from working with the Coalition because of their Baathist history. The American State Department officials tried to get a waver, and it wasn't granted. So these Generals were excluded because, I don't know, someone thought they drank blood.

Did you witness translators abusing their position?

All the time. Since I hadn't supported the war I didn't have a lot of enthusiasm for bringing the "bad guys" to justice. I had an Iraqi-American Shi'a friend who participated, and he made sure they knew that they were gonna "git em"—show those people who were really in charge.

Was that something you grappled with?
Absolutely. I was very careful to maintain distance, but who knows, maybe I get something in two questions later. Like in the way I might respond. There's a lot of subliminal stuff going on.

With all the desire to find a solution in Iraq, is it still the case that speaking to the Iraqis isn't something we take seriously?
It's because we don't value foreign language. Not just for ourselves but strategically. I think most people that are involved consider it a troublesome chore. It's annoying that other countries speak other languages and it would be easier if they spoke English.

So the Iraqis will just learn English at this point?
They've gone through so much. They went through Saddam Hussein. They went through our sanctions program. Now this. Trying to get them to trust you is just really, really hard. We're not speaking their language. If we want a partnership with them, if they're hurt, it's time to speak softly to them.

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